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 I. Introduction  – Th e EU Involvement in the 
Criminalisation of Irregular Migration 
 Th e past decade has witnessed the growing use of substantive criminal law 
as a method of tackling irregular migration. At the European level, this 
trend   – commonly referred to as the criminalisation of irregular migration or 
 ‘ crimmigration ’ 1  – has been fl eshed out by both the EU legislator and the 
Member States individually. In particular, the EU involvement takes place 
in a twofold manner; directly, through harmonisation of national legislation 
and indirectly, through the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). 
In recent years, the EU has adopted substantive criminal law provisions which 
treat conduct associated with irregular migration fl ows as crimes and provide for 
sanctions for the violation of these provisions. Th e traffi  cking of human beings is 
a prime example in that respect, with Directive 2011/36/EU 2 substituting a pre-
Lisbon Framework Decision 3 and Directive 2004/81/EC granting (conditional) 
residence permits rights to victims of traffi  cking. 4 Human smuggling, or in more 
neutral EU terms, the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit or residence, 
is regulated by a dual legislative framework, which mirrors the former pillar 
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 structure; a Directive which  sets out the defi nitions for the crimes 5 is accom-
panied by a Framework Decision criminalising the conduct described in the 
Directive and setting out sanctions. 6 Th is set of legal instruments is completed 
by the Employers ’ Sanctions Directive, 7 which imposes duties to employers of 
irregular migrants and provides for sanctions if they fail to comply with these 
duties or they infringe the prohibition of not employing  ‘ illegally staying third-
country nationals ’. 8 
 Th e primary focus of these instruments is on individuals who act as facilitators 
or intermediaries of irregular migration in a broad sense. Conversely, any viola-
tions of immigration law by irregular migrants themselves are not dealt with by 
EU law. However, legislation attributing criminal law sanctions to the violations of 
immigration law committed by irregular migrants has been put in place in most 
Member States. Key examples in this context are the treatment of irregular entry 
and stay as criminal off ences with penalties varying from imprisonment to fi nes 
and to a lesser extent warnings. 9 Th e EU is not watching from a distance these 
parallel national developments and in this sense it indirectly infl uences national 
legislations. By using as a motor the Directive on the return of  ‘ illegally staying ’ 
third-country nationals ( ‘ Return Directive ’ ), 10 the CJEU has placed strict limi-
tations on the Member States ’ power to enforce criminal sanctions to irregular 
migrants by diff erentiating treatment and imposing numerous conditions. 
 Th e judgment in  El Dridi , delivered in April 2011 11 has been the fi rst in a 
series of cases 12 imposing boundaries to Member States in criminalising irregu-
lar migrants and the aim of this commentary is to assess its implications for EU 
law as it set the foundations for an indirect involvement of the EU in a much 
controversial and heated topic. 13 In this context, this commentary fi rst provides 
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a brief overview of the Return Directive; while an in-depth examination of these 
issues is beyond the scope of the present commentary, a brief overview will inform 
the subsequent analysis. Th en, the CJEU fi ndings in  El Dridi will be discussed, 
followed by an analysis of its impact on EU law and an overview of the case law 
that has further refi ned the Court ’ s proclamations. 
 II. Th e Return Directive as the Stormy Petrel 
 Th e Return Directive is the pan-European legal instrument that has been adopted 
with the aim of providing common standards on the eff ective removal and repa-
triation of  ‘ illegally staying third-country nationals ’. 14 In a nutshell, the Directive 
prescribes that in cases where an irregular migrant is detected on national terri-
tory, Member States ’ authorities are obliged to issue a return decision (Article 6). 
Th e addressee is in principle granted a period of voluntary departure ranging 
between seven and 30 days (Article 7). If that period expires and there is no 
other suffi  cient but less coercive measure available, the irregular migrants may be 
detained pending removal in specialised facilities for a period of up to 18 months 
(Articles 15 – 18). According to Article 11(1) of the Return Directive, an entry 
ban must be issued where a return decision was ordered without a period for 
voluntary departure being granted, or where the obligation to return has not been 
complied with. In other cases, an entry ban may be issued. 
 Much ink has been spilt about the Return Directive, with an array of scholars 
and practitioners 15 raising signifi cant concerns regarding its restrictive char-
acter, particularly as regards the rules on detention and the absence of a clear 
fundamental rights approach to irregular migrants. 16 Civil organisations have 
been highly critical of the Directive, to the extent that it has been nicknamed 
as the  ‘ directive of shame ’. 17 At the same time, the controversy surrounding its 
provisions has meant that the CJEU is repeatedly requested to provide guidance 
and interpretation on its rules. 18 However, there exists a second type of case that 
276 Niovi Vavoula
 G and R  ECLI:EU:C:2013:533 ;  C-297/12  Filev  & Osmani  ECLI:EU:C:2013:569 ;  C-146/14 PPU  Mahdi 
 ECLI:EU:C:2014:1320 ;  C-189/13  Da Silva  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2043 ;  C-473/13  Bero  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2095 ; 
 C-514/13  Bouzalmate  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2095 ;  C-474/13  Pham  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2095 ;  C-166/13 
 Mukarubega  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2336 ;  C-249/13  Boujlida  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431 ;  C-554/13  Zh 
and O  ECLI:EU:C:2015:377 ;  C-38/14  Zaizoune  ECLI:EU:C:2015:260 ;  C-225/16  Ouhrami 
 ECLI:EU:C:2017:590 ; and  C-240/17  E  ECLI:EU:C:2018:8 . 
  19  See the second part of this chapter entitled  ‘ Reshaping Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in 
Italy: Th e Impact of EU Law beyond the El-Dridi Judgment ’ by Alessandra Annoni. 
  20  For an analysis of the  ‘ Security Package ’ see  Alberto  di Martino ,  Fransesca  Biondi Dal Monte ,  Ilaria 
 Boiano and  Rosa  Rafaellli ,  Th e Criminalization of Irregular Immigration:  Law and Practice in Italy ( Pisa 
University Press ,  2013 ) . 
  21  Paolo  Bonetti ,  ‘ La Proroga del Trattenimento e I Reati di Ingresso o Permanenza Irregolare nel 
Sistema del Diritto degli Stranieri :  Profi li Constituzionali e Rapporti con la Direttiva Comunitaria sui 
Rimpranti ’ [ 2009 ]  Diritto Immigrazione e Cittadinanza  85 . 
does  not directly relate to the interpretation of the Directive ’ s provisions, but 
engages in the interaction between the Member States ’ sovereign powers to crimi-
nalise violations of national immigration law and the eff ectiveness of the Return 
Directive, with the leading case being  El Dridi . 
 III. Th e Judgment in  El Dridi : A Decisive Step towards 
the Delimitation of Member States ’ Power 
to Criminalise Irregular Migrants 
 A. Legal and Factual Background 
 In  El Dridi , the CJEU was faced with an Italian legislation which assigned criminal 
sanctions to irregular migrants who had failed to comply with a return decision 
and remained at the national territory. As is explained by Annoni in the second 
part of this chapter, 19 the Italian Government had adopted a series of legislative 
measures, commonly known as the  ‘ Security Package ’ ( Pacchetto Sicurezza ), 20 
including a law that addressed some aspects of the Return Directive. However, the 
underlying aim was to avoid implementation of the Return Directive 21 by intro-
ducing new immigration off ences of irregular entry or stay that were punishable 
with a fi ne (Art 10  bis ), whereas failure to comply with a return decision would be 
sanctioned with imprisonment of one to four years (Article 14.5  ter and  quater ). 
Th is is because Article 2 of the Return Directive gives leeway to Member States 
to exclude from its scope persons who have been  ‘ subject to return as a criminal 
law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national 
law ’. By essentially criminalising all irregular migrants, Italy desired to bypass its 
obligations pursuant to the Directive. 
 In this context, Mr El Dridi, an Algerian national, had entered Italy irregu-
larly and had never obtained a valid residence permit. In 2004, he was issued an 
expulsion decree which six years later served as a basis for a deportation order. 
C-61/11 PPU – El Dridi 277
  22  El Dridi (n 11), para 31 (emphasis added). 
  23  Mitsilegas (n 8) 101. 
  24  See  Annaliese  Baldaccini ,  ‘ Th e EU Directive on Return :  Principles and Protests ’ ( 2009 )  Refugee 
Survey Quarterly  125 . 
Th ough he was requested to voluntarily leave the country within fi ve days, in 
September 2010 he was arrested and sentenced to one year ’ s imprisonment by 
the District Court of Trento for the crime of failing to comply with a return 
order on the basis of Article 14.5 ter. Mr El Dridi appealed against that deci-
sion before the Appeal Court of Trento. Th e latter submitted a reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU enquiring whether a criminal sanction during 
administrative procedures concerning his return due to non-compliance with 
the stages of those procedures complied with the Return Directive, particularly 
its Articles 15 and 16 on detention. 
 B. Th e Judgment 
 From the outset, the Court highlighted the purpose and character of the Return 
Directive. It was stressed that according to Recital 2, its aim is  ‘ the establishment 
of an eff ective removal and repatriation policy [ … ]  for persons to be returned in 
a humane manner and with full respect for their fundamental rights and also their 
dignity ’. 22 It thus employed a restrictive interpretation of the Directive paving the 
way on how it should be interpreted at the national level as well. 23 Furthermore, 
this remark is crucial in the light of the heated debate surrounding the inclusion 
of fundamental rights references into the Directive. 24 By founding its reasoning on 
the basis of fundamental rights, the ruling served as a reminder to Member States 
about the paramount importance of ensuring a high level of fundamental rights 
protection in the return procedure. 
 Next, the Court codifi ed the removal process in a series of successive 
stages. Th e chronology begins with the issuance of a return decision. Th en, the 
prescription of a period for voluntary departure is prioritised unless particular 
circumstances dictate otherwise. If the irregular migrant has not voluntar-
ily complied with the decision, national authorities are obliged to carry out 
the removal by taking all the appropriate measures. However, the principle of 
proportionality and the respect of fundamental rights must be observed and, 
therefore, the least coercive measures should be preferred. Deprivation of liberty 
and detention are allowed aft er assessing each specifi c case and only when the 
enforcement of the return decision in the form of removal risks to be compro-
mised by the conduct of the person at stake. Th e Court highlighted that the 
order in which the stages of the return procedure are to take place corresponds 
to a gradation of the measures to be taken in order to enforce the return deci-
sion. Th is means that the measures become more stringent as the procedure 
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evolves from the less restrictive in regards to the individual ’ s liberty (voluntary 
departure) to the most constraining (detention in a specialised facility). 25 
 Having set out the lens through which the Directive should be interpreted, 
the next step for the CJEU was to determine whether in the absence of national 
implementation, Articles 15 and 16 of the Directive were directly eff ective in the 
specifi c case. Th e Court found no diffi  culty in granting the relevant provisions 
direct eff ect; since they are suffi  ciently clear and precise, 26 Mr El Dridi could rely 
upon them. Th e Court thus sent a gentle reminder to Member States that they could 
not act on their own motion and evade their obligations under EU law. Th is was 
precisely the Italian case, with the adopted legislation providing for a return proce-
dure which signifi cantly deviated from the standards of the Directive. 27 
 Th e core of the judgment is preoccupied with the interplay between the 
Return Directive on the removal of irregular migrants and the enforcement of 
national rules imposing criminal sanctions for violation of immigration laws. Th e 
Grand Chamber started its analysis by recognising a certain degree of discretion 
to Member States when adopting measures, including criminal law ones, aimed 
inter alia at dissuading third-country nationals from remaining illegally on their 
national territory. However, it imposed two signifi cant restrictions; fi rst, these 
measures may come into play only when all other measures already employed 
have failed to attain the objective of removal. 28 Second, it reiterated that although 
criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for which 
the Member States are responsible, this area of law is nevertheless aff ected by 
EU law. 29 Th erefore, although the legal basis of the Directive (and its Lisbon 
successor) or the Directive itself do not preclude them from having competence 
in criminal matters in the area of illegal immigration and illegal stays, their legis-
lation must comply with EU law nevertheless. 30 Th e Court thus justifi ed these 
limitations on the basis of the principles of eff ectiveness and loyal cooperation. 
It prohibited Member States from applying rules, even criminal law ones, which 
are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives pursued by the Direc-
tive and deprive it of its eff ectiveness. It invoked Article 4(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) which obliges Member States to  ‘ [ … ] refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union ’ s objectives ’ and 
Recital 13 of the Return Directive which makes the use of coercive measures 
subject to the principles of proportionality and eff ectiveness. 31 
 Consequently, the Grand Chamber opined that Member States may not, in 
order to remedy their failure of coercive measures adopted during the return 
procedure, provide for a custodial sentence solely because a third-country national 
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may be compromised because it is liable to frustrate the application of the meas-
ures and delay the enforcement of the return decision. 33 Despite these restrictions, 
the Court recalled Member States that they are still allowed to adopt and employ 
criminal law provisions in situations when coercive measures did not lead to the 
removal of an irregular migrant. 34 However, the Court was mindful to note that 
the adoption of these provisions must occur with respect to the principles and 
objectives of the Return Directive, which continues to be the benchmark for the 
adoption of national criminal law. 
 C. Th e Value of  El Dridi for EU Law 
 El Dridi has made its way in jurisprudential history as a victory for irregu-
lar migrants in three main respects. First, the Grand Chamber stressed that the 
Return Directive must be interpreted in the light of fundamental rights. Th us, 
notwithstanding the Council ’ s attempts to disassociate the return procedure from 
the protection of fundamental rights of irregular migrants, the Court succeeded in 
giving the Preamble a more substantial context and made it clear that references in 
the Preamble constitute interpretative guides. Second, as regards to Italy ’ s attempt 
to bypass EU rules, the Court gave a warning to Member States that circumvent-
ing the transposition of the instrument and developing an autonomous path in 
immigration policy will prove extremely hard. 
 Th ird, the most important contribution of  El Dridi involves the Member 
States ’ power to impose national criminal law provisions to irregular migrants and 
the overall relationship between EU law and national criminal law. Th e judgment 
confi rmed that the former places limits on the adoption of and employability 
of the latter and that Member States are not entirely free to introduce criminal 
law rules, but are required to comply with their obligations under EU law when 
exercising their powers to criminalise, in particular obligations deriving from the 
principles of loyal cooperation and eff ectiveness. In the case of prosecuting and 
penalising irregular migrants, the practical impact of that pronouncement was 
that as long as the removal process is ongoing, the Member States are not allowed 
to impose a term of imprisonment to third-country nationals whose sole miscon-
duct is their stay on the national territory contrary to a return order. 
 Th is was the fi rst time that an EU immigration law instrument was found to 
have a delimiting eff ect on the Member States ’ power to criminalise. In the frame-
work of free movement, as early as in 1981, the CJEU opined that Community 
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law places boundaries to the application of national criminal law with a view to 
safeguarding the eff ectiveness of rights related to free movement. 35 In  Casati , the 
Court held that although criminal law is presumed to be a matter for which the 
Member States are responsible,  ‘ Community law sets certain limits in that area 
as regards the control measures which it permits the Member States to maintain 
in connection with the free movement of goods and persons ’. 36 As a result, the 
penalties imposed ought to be strictly necessary and not so disproportionate to 
the gravity of the infringement that they become an obstacle to the exercise of that 
freedom. 37 Th is approach was justifi ed in order to prevent the erosion of Commu-
nity law freedoms by national criminal rules. 38 Although in the end the Italian 
legislation in question was found compatible with Community law, the Court 
based its approach on a strict proportionality test. 39 Th is approach was confi rmed 
in subsequent cases; in  Skanavi and Chryssanthakopoulos , 40 the Court ruled that 
a provision sanctioning persons who had failed to convert their driving licences 
obtained outside Germany within a prescribed period was incompatible with 
Community law due to  ‘ the eff ect which the right to drive a motor vehicle has 
on the actual exercise of the rights relating to the free movement of persons ’. 41 
Furthermore, in  Placanica, Palazzese and Sorricchio , regarding criminal sanctions 
imputed for the organised activity of collecting bets without obtaining a licence 
or a police authorisation, the Court held a criminal penalty is incompatible with 
free movement rights, where the defendants were unable to obtain licences or 
authorisations because that Member State, in breach of Community law, refused 
to grant licences or authorisations to such persons. 42 Finally, in  Bickel and Franz , 
concerning the language of criminal proceedings, the Court clarifi ed that such 
specifi cations may be subject to limitations for the purpose of ensuring non-
discrimination as well as free movement rights. 43 
 El Dridi must be seen as a consistent application and a successful trans-
plantation of the CJEU ’ s approach in relation to free movement rights. In the 
present case, the objective pursued shift ed from free movement to the estab-
lishment of an eff ective policy of returns of irregular migrants. What is more 
important is the nature of the instrument the eff ective implementation of which 
is safeguarded. Being an enforcement mechanism and arguably the  ‘ black sheep ’ 
of EU immigration law,  El Dridi creates an interesting paradox; the Directive 
which has been criticised for its restrictive approach and lack of high standards 
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of fundamental rights protection is used by the Court as a buff er to protect 
irregular migrants from being imprisoned for the sole reason that they have 
violated domestic immigration laws. 
 It has been eloquently argued that criminalisation is not banned in its 
entirety. 44 Th e judgment left  to the Member States a degree of discretion by 
stating that the latter retain the power to adopt provisions in cases where coer-
cive measures have failed to lead to the removal of a third-country national. 
However, the Court went on to state that even in these cases the imposition 
of the measures must occur with respect to the principles and objective of the 
Directive. Given the wide divergence of national legislations on the issue and the 
shared competence between Member States and the EU in immigration matters, 
it seems that the Court attempted to strike a balance between national interests 
and the protection of irregular migrants. Importantly, despite the judgment ’ s 
limited scope, it opened Pandora ’ s Box regarding the application of a wide array 
of Member States ’ measures criminalising irregular migrants ’ conducts. A key 
question in that respect was whether these pronouncements could apply not only 
when the criminal off ence in question related to a violation of a return order, but 
more broadly with any violation of national criminal law, which could interfere 
with the return of third-country nationals. Th e following section summarises 
the key judgments released by the Court that further elaborate and develop the 
 El Dridi rationale. 
 IV. Subsequent Case Law: A Comprehensive Approach 
towards Criminalisation of Irregular Migrants ? 
 A. Th e Good News: Deepening and Expanding 
the  El Dridi Logic 
 Following the release of  El Dridi , practitioners and judges in diff erent Member 
States were faced with legal uncertainty as to whether the classifi cation of irregu-
lar stay as a criminal off ence was in line with the judgment at least when a return 
decision had been issued. In France, the problem was particularly acute; at that 
time, French immigration law criminalised irregular stay foreseeing punishment 
of imprisonment of up to one year and a fi ne of 3750 Euros. 45 In addition, third-
country nationals were placed in police custody ( garde  à vue ) by the French police, 
which would carry out investigations before transferring irregular migrants to an 
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administrative detention centre awaiting their removal. 46 Mr Achughbabian, an 
Armenian national, was arrested and placed into custody, but his case diff ered 
in that he was sanctioned before the return procedure had been set in motion. 47 
Th erefore, criminalisation of irregular stay took place independently and was not 
related to the removal process, thus raising the question of whether the Return 
Directive would apply in the fi rst place. 
 Th e CJEU found no diffi  culty in ascertaining that the case fell within the 
scope of the Directive. In the Court ’ s view, in order to ensure its eff ectiveness, 
national authorities must act with diligence and take a position without delay on 
the legality, or otherwise of the stay of the person concerned. Upon fi nding that a 
third-country national is irregularly staying, in principle a return decision must 
be issued. Detention is thus inextricably linked with the outcome of the removal 
of the third-country national concerned. 48 Th en, the Grand Chamber compared 
the return procedures as set out in the Directive and as in French legislation to 
note the diff erent character of the procedures and conclude that the latter may 
jeopardise the application of the Directive ’ s rules and thus its eff ectiveness. 49 Th e 
Court went on to dismiss arguments by the French Government regarding the 
rare imposition of such sanctions unless they had committed another off ence 
apart from their irregular stay; 50 not only such possibility remained open for the 
courts, but also, the Directive would be deprived of its eff ectiveness and binding 
eff ect as it would be interpreted as making it lawful for Member States not to apply 
the provisions of the Directive to all third-country nationals whose only crime is 
their illegal stay. 51 Th e Court also made it clear that imposing custodial sentences 
to irregularly staying third-country nationals before carrying out their removal 
was also not possible; 52 it follows from the duty of loyal cooperation and the prin-
ciple of eff ectiveness that once national authorities establish that a third-country 
national is an irregular migrant they are required to carry out the removal as 
soon as possible. Th is will not take place if instead of implementing a return deci-
sion (perhaps not even adopting one on time) criminal prosecution is initiated 
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accompanied by a term of imprisonment. Th is in-between step would delay the 
removal and besides is not included among the justifi cations for a postponement 
of removal as set out in the Directive. 53 
 Finally, having in mind the impact of the judgment on national sovereignty 
and in order to address their concerns as regards the application of national poli-
cies to deter and prevent irregular migration, the Court confi rmed its fi nding in 
 El Dridi that Member States retain their power to adopt criminal law provisions 
in situations when the coercive measures did not make it possible to remove the 
third-country national. 54 However, even in these cases, which are outside the 
scope of the Directive, the Grand Chamber managed to  ‘ sneak ’ two further 
limitations: fi rst, penal sanctions may be imposed in those cases involving a third-
country national who has been subjected to a return procedure and is illegally 
staying in the territory of a Member State  ‘ without there being any justifi ed ground 
for non-return ’ ; 55 and second, the imposition of such penalties must be subjected 
to full observance of fundamental rights, in particular the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 56 
 Achughbabian is an important follow-up case to  El Dridi ; it clarifi ed that 
the criminalisation of irregular stay cannot be an aim in itself, but is ultimately 
linked to the objective of the return of the third-country nationals aff ected, 
thus bringing into play the application of EU law. Furthermore, while the Court 
was careful to leave Member States with a certain degree of fl exibility to adopt 
criminal law in relation to immigration off ences, it provided a clearer idea as to 
the circumstances under which a custodial sentence may be imposed to third-
country nationals for violations of domestic immigration laws. In particular, the 
imposition of a term of imprisonment may take place in cases where the return 
procedure has been applied but failed and there is no justifi ed ground for non-
return. It has been pointed out that the Court seems to refer to two categories 
of third-country nationals; those whose return is precluded by international 
law (non-refoulement) and those whose removal cannot take place for reasons 
outside their sphere of infl uence. Th e latter category would include nationals 
who cannot be returned either because their country of origin does not allow 
their return (eg by not issuing travel documents) or because the Member State 
responsible lacks the means for repatriation. 57 Otherwise, it would seem unrea-
sonable to impose and enforce custodial sentences to individuals who  – through 
no fault of their own  – cannot be removed. Th erefore, irregular migrants 
could be subjected to imprisonment if their return is obstructed by their 
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personal conduct. 58  In addition, although at fi rst sight the legislation in question 
did not appear to be directly related to the Directive, the Court managed to bring 
it within the realms of EU law and apply the  El Dridi logic. By doing so, it made 
it highly unlikely for Member States to unlink the Directive from the crimi-
nalisation of irregular migrants at the national level. As such, the judgment in 
 El Dridi , as further refi ned and elaborated on in  Achughbabian , had far-reaching 
implications for Member States ’ power to impose criminal sanctions to irregular 
migrants. 59 Th is is because the vast majority of Member States treat irregu-
lar stay as a criminal off ence, ten of which prescribe the imposition of a fi ne 
and/or imprisonment. 60 In those cases, imposition of a criminal sanction 
before or during the return process is found to be incompatible with the Return 
Directive. 
 Th e criminal off ence of irregular entry is of a similar nature, as it is punishable 
with imprisonment and/or a fi ne in 17 Member States. Although  Achughbabian 
refers specifi cally to the criminal off ence of irregular stay, excluding irregular 
entry could lead to unjust results for irregular migrants. Th e CJEU had the oppor-
tunity to clarify this issue in the case of  Aff um , 61 a Ghanaian national, who was 
intercepted by French authorities at the entrance of the Channel Tunnel, whilst 
transiting through French territory on a bus from Belgium to the UK. She was 
detained for illegal entry, but the prosecutor decided to take no further criminal 
proceedings against her. An Order was issued deciding her transfer to Belgium in 
accordance with a readmission agreement between France and the Benelux coun-
tries, coupled with a decision on her administrative detention pending removal. 
Upon appeal, the Court of Cassation submitted a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU on the compatibility of the Return Directive with national law 
allowing the imposition of a term of imprisonment of a third-country national on 
the basis of illegal entry and stay. Th e Court asserted that third-country nationals 
found  ‘ staying illegally on the territory of a Member State ’ fall within the scope 
of the Return Directive. 62 Aft er reiterating its fi ndings in  Achughbabian , 63 the 
Court confi rmed its application also in the case of illegal stay by opining that  ‘ the 
concepts of  “ illegal stay ” and  “ illegal entry ” are closely linked, as such entry is 
one of the factual circumstances that may result in the third-country national ’ s 
stay on the territory of the Member State concerned being illegal ’. 64 As a result, 
Ms Aff um had to be subject to the procedures laid down in the Return Directive 
for the purpose of her removal and could not be imprisoned merely on account of 
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her illegal entry, resulting in an illegal stay, as this would thwart the application of 
the Directive and undermine its eff ectiveness. 65 
 B. Th e Bad News: A Nuanced Approach towards 
Criminalisation of Irregular Migrants ? 
 Th e judgments examined above provide a comprehensive approach towards 
custodial sentences imposed to irregular migrants before or during the return 
process. However, in numerous Member States, violations of domestic immi-
gration provisions are sanctioned by way of a pecuniary penalty. 66 Th e extent 
to which such sanctions could be imposed on third-country nationals was dealt 
with in the case of Mr Sagor, 67 who was fi ned aft er being apprehended for irregu-
larly staying on Italian territory, as prescribed in Italian legislation. 68 Th e latter 
further provided that in cases where the third-country national aff ected could 
not aff ord to pay the fi ne, the fi ne would be converted to home detention. 69 Th e 
judgment in  Sagor is a faithful application of the  El Dridi logic, which this time 
led to the opposite result, as the Court opined that the imposition of a fi ne as a 
sanction to irregular migrants is in compliance with the Directive. In particular, 
the Court contended that a pending criminal prosecution in itself does not delay 
or otherwise impede the return. Th is is because the removal of a third-country 
national can be achieved without requiring that prosecution to have come to an 
end. Indeed, under the Italian legislation in question, criminal proceedings are 
discontinued once the national court is informed that the individual concerned 
has been returned. 70 Similarly, the imposition of a fi ne does not constitute a hurdle 
in the procedure, since it does not prevent a return decision from being taken and 
implemented in full compliance with the Directive. Th is fi nding has signifi cant 
repercussions for a rather large number of Member States that penalise irregular 
stay with a pecuniary penalty, as such legislation remains applicable throughout 
the return process. Furthermore, the initiation of a criminal prosecution parallel 
to the return process also does not jeopardise the attainment of the Directive. 
Neither an expulsion order without the prescription of a period for voluntary 
return is forbidden. As a result, the criminalisation of irregular migrants while 
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the return procedure is ongoing is still possible as long as the penalty imposed is 
restricted to a fi ne and the overarching objective of removing irregular migrants 
remains the top priority of national authorities. Unless the CJEU had chosen a 
diff erent line of reasoning on the basis of the principle of proportionality and the 
respect of fundamental rights, it would have been diffi  cult to rule otherwise. Th e 
Court was thus  ‘ trapped ’ in its own path of thinking and could not have provided 
a more protective framework for the third-country nationals aff ected. However, 
in relation to the conversion of a fi ne with home detention, the CJEU reiterated 
that Member States are obliged to carry out the removal as soon as possible. 71 
Th us, home detention does not contribute to the achievement of the removal, 
namely the physical transportation of the relevant individual outside the Member 
State ’ s territory. In reasoning similar to  El Dridi , it noted that home detention also 
does not constitute a  ‘ measure ’ or a  ‘ coercive measure ’ within the meaning of the 
Return Directive. 72 In this context, it imposed a further limitation to national 
criminal law provisions. However, once again, the Court was mindful not to make 
general observations, but to leave room for Member States to adjust their legis-
lation accordingly. It noted that non-compliance arises in particular where the 
applicable legislation does not provide that the enforcement of a home detention 
order imposed on an illegally staying third-country national must come to an end 
as soon as it is possible to eff ect that person ’ s removal. 73 
 Th e second question that the Court had to tackle involves the extent to which 
the  El Dridi logic could also apply in cases of entry ban violations. Th is was dealt 
with in the case of  Celaj , 74 which involved an Albanian national staying illegally 
in Italy and convicted of attempted robbery. In 2012, he was issued a deporta-
tion order accompanied by a three-year entry ban, returned to his country of 
origin and re-entered the Italian territory in breach of a re-entry ban. However, 
in  February 2014 he was arrested for the criminal off ence of breaching an entry 
ban, which is punishable with imprisonment of up to four years under Italian 
law. 75 Contrary to the previous judgments and the Opinion of Advocate General 
Szpunar delivered on that case, 76 it was held that the case did not concern the 
termination of Celaj ’ s fi rst irregular stay, but his subsequent re-entry in violation 
of the entry ban issued in the return decision. 77 As such, the circumstances in 
that case were found to be  ‘ clearly distinct ’ from previous judgments. 78 Th e Court 
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supported this view by referring to  Achughbabian , which, as noted above, permits 
the imposition of sanctions in cases of failed return procedures which may be 
impinged on third-country nationals themselves. 79  Achughbabian was interpreted 
in an argument a fortiori 80  –  a minore ad maius  – and the Court concluded that 
as long as the entry ban is issued in compliance with Article 11 of the Return 
 Directive, 81 the Directive does not preclude the possibility for Member States to 
impose a custodial sentence for the breach of entry ban. However, it was reiterated 
that the imposition of such sanction is subject to the full observance of fundamen-
tal rights and the Geneva Convention. 82 
 Celaj has attracted mixed reviews by legal scholars, 83 not least because 
it marks the fi rst time that the Court has deviated from pre-existing case law, 
particularly  El Dridi , to hold that imprisonment as a criminal law sanction is 
compatible with the Return Directive irrespective of the existence of a return 
procedure. As it has been pointed out, the Court seems to suggest that two types 
of illegal stay can be distinguished; one that has taken place initially and one 
aft er the person was removed and returned on national territory. Whereas in 
the former case, Member States have no choice but to apply the Return Direc-
tive, in the latter case a prison sentence may be imposed so as to dissuade the 
third-country national in question from re-entering the national territory in 
an irregular manner. Th at division seems to be ill-conceptualised and so is the 
justifi cation for abandoning the eff ectiveness argument and thus derogating from 
the purpose of the Return Directive. Th e Court ’ s interpretation of  Achughbabian 
as covering situations whereby the person has left  the territory and returned, as 
opposed to a narrow interpretation advocated by the Advocate General which 
would cover only situations where authorities did not succeed in returning the 
person concerned who remains on national territory, seems to be overly expan-
sive. In the case of Mr Celaj, the return process as prescribed in the Return 
Directive was successfully completed leading to his removal, hence the objective 
of the Directive remains valid. Nevertheless, the Court seems to understand that 
lack of cooperation on his behalf is extended even aft er the completion of the 
return process, throughout the duration of the entry ban. Th is is a particularly 
problematic understanding of the nature of the entry ban given that Article 11 of 
the Return Directive allows Member States wide discretion in issuing and with-
drawing entry bans, which in practice may lead to their imposition  en masse and 
in a systematic manner. Th is is more than rhetoric. Th is discretion is refl ected 
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in the more recent evaluation of the Return Directive, whereby in no less than 
11 Schengen States an entry ban is automatically issued alongside a return deci-
sion, whereas in 14 countries irregular migrants are issued with an entry ban on 
the basis of the criteria set out in Article 11(1). 84 In three states only the entry 
ban decision is taken on a case-by-case basis. 85 Th is directly impacts the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions to second-time or repeated irregular migrants, who 
on the basis of  Celaj , may be subjected to custodial sentences. However, as high-
lighted by the Advocate General, imprisonment delays the return process and 
compromises the purpose and eff ectiveness of the Return Directive, which was 
preciously defended in  El Dridi a few years before. Th is was hardly discussed by 
the Court in what is arguably a laconic judgment for the important implications 
it entails. Overall, the Court seems to tolerate and even support the preventive 
approach towards the irregular migrants as envisaged by Member States and thus 
take a signifi cant step back towards protecting national sovereignty 86 in adopting 
and imposing criminal sanctions against irregular migrants. 
 V. Conclusion 
 Th e aim of this contribution was to highlight the importance attached to the 
 El Dridi judgment in delimiting Member States ’ power to adopt and impose 
criminal law provisions as a means of tackling irregular migration. Th e ruling 
marked the fi rst time that this issue was brought within the auspices of EU law, 
with the Court utilising the Return Directive to surround irregular migrants with 
a protective net, while placing signifi cant barriers to the imposition of impris-
onment sanctions. Th e mechanism was old and well-known: Member States are 
not entirely free to adopt criminal law measures, but are required to comply with 
their obligations under EU law when exercising their powers to criminalise, in 
particular obligations stemming from the principles of loyal cooperation and 
eff ectiveness. Otherwise, the attainment of the objectives of the Directive and its 
eff ective application will be endangered. Th us, by playing the eff ectiveness card, 
domestic criminal laws regulating irregular migration are subjected to several 
limitations and guidelines. 
 Th e signifi cance of  El Dridi should be seen in the context of the subsequent 
case law that expanded its logic to a wide range of immigration off ences. To codify 
the Court ’ s pronouncements: in principle, the Return Directive does not preclude 
a Member State from classifying irregular entry and stay as a criminal off ence 
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and attaching penal sanctions to deter and prevent infringement of the national 
rules on residence. However, criminal provisions may not be applied before or 
during the return process when their eff ect would jeopardise the eff ective removal 
of the irregular migrant. Nonetheless, as noted in  Sagor , the eff ectiveness argu-
ment has signifi cant limits, in the cases of pecuniary sanctions and  – to a lesser 
extent  – home detention. In cases where coercive measures did not lead to the 
removal of the person concerned, Member States enjoy a wide degree of discre-
tionary power to impose sanctions. Th is was concretised in  Achughbabian , where 
the CJEU held that penal sanctions may be imposed in cases of third-country 
nationals to whom the return procedure has been applied and who are illegally 
staying in the territory of a Member State without there being any justifi ed ground 
for non-return. In that respect, it was shown that in  Celaj the Court opted for 
an expansive reading of this derogation with a view to addressing sovereignty 
concerns over criminalising repeated violations of immigration laws. Th is was an 
unfortunate and controversial change in the mindset of the Court that seems to 
have forgotten the eff ectiveness arguments as proclaimed in  El Dridi in  lieu of a 
restrictive approach that required further justifi cation, particularly in the light of 
the  Advocate General ’ s Opinion, who raised more broadly the issue of whether it 
is a crime to be a foreigner. 87 Th is change of heart may arguably spark criticism 
as regards the complicity of the EU in criminalising irregular migrants. A holistic 
overview of the case law shows that this complicity is a moving target and perhaps 
the pronouncements in the leading case of  El Dridi have recently been nuanced 
and compromised for the sake of protecting national sovereignty. It remains to be 
seen whether the Return Directive will generate more cases that will further refi ne 
or rebut the fi ndings in  El Dridi . Th e tenuous relationship between EU immigra-
tion law and domestic criminal law is far from being settled and will thus remain 
in the spotlight. 
 
